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iAbstract
Auction houses across the world must decide in which way to organize the lots which 
they sell in their auctions. This paper examines the decisions faced by a wine auctioneer 
whose goal is to obtain the highest price per bottle for the wines she is selling. Data from 
the USA’s Chicago Wine Company were used in order to answer two specific questions 
which deal with lot formation.
Initially the study focuses on lots which only contain one particular vintage in varying 
quantities (single-vintage lots), and then considers the case of lots with multiple vintages 
in varying quantities (multi-vintage lots). The study notes that when taking into account 
the particular characteristics of the wines in question (such as the quality, the place of 
origin, and the physical bottle condition), the results and subsequent conclusions maybe 
be different than when simply considering price averages.
Using both ordinary least squares and maximum likelihood regressions, the study’s 
first conclusion is that, contrary to a result obtained by Bentzen and Smith (2003), 
increasing the number of bottles in a single-vintage lot will decrease the overall price per 
bottle of that lot, when all the wine’s characteristics are taken into account. The second 
result was the identification of a positive link between the size of a multi-vintage lot and 
its valuation. More specifically, the study shows that as the size of the multi-vintage lot 
increases, so does the probability that the bottles in the lot will cost less per bottle than if 
ii
they were bought individually. Both results combine together to show that if an 
auctioneer wishes to obtain the maximum price per bottle for her lots, she should sell 
each of her wines individually as single unit lots.
iii
Sommaire
Les maisons d’enchères partout dans le monde doivent décider dans quelle façon 
organiser les lots qu’elles mettent en vente. Ce rapport examine les décisions qui font 
face à une maison d’enchères qui a le but d’obtenir le prix maximum par bouteille de vin 
qu’elle met en enchère. Des données du Chicago Wine Company sont utilisées pour 
répondre à plusieurs questions qui concernent la formation des lots.
Initialement l’étude se base sur les lots qui contiennent seulement une cuvée 
particulaire et puis considère après les lots qui contiennent plusieurs cuvées différentes. 
L’étude note que quand les caractéristiques particulaires des vins (comme sa qualité, son 
origine, et la condition de sa bouteille)  son contrôlés, les résultats et conclusions peuvent 
être différentes qu’une étude qui considère seulement les moyennes.
En se servant des régressions moindres carrées ordinaires et maximum de 
vraisemblance, l’étude réussi à établir un lien positive et significatif entre la quantité 
vendu et le prix par bouteille payé. La conclusion finale est donc qu’une maison 




“In wine there is truth”
“Bonum vinum laetificat cor hominis”
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1I. Introduction
Since the beginning of modern wine production (heralded by Baron Edmond de 
Rothschild in 1870)1 the wine industry has greatly evolved from its origins of producing a
sweet and unappealing beverage to catering to the intellectual and health-savvy obsession 
of many individuals in many countries across the world. The world demand for wine has 
risen steadily over the recent years, having grown by nearly 2% (in volume) in 2003 to 
25,066 million litres2 (with the market for red wine responsible for most this growth). In 
the period from 1997 to 2003, the total world consumption of wine increased by 6.9%.3
This increase in demand can be attributed in part to the modern scientific studies 
which claim that the polyphenol substances found in red wine reduce the risks of many 
common health hazards such as heart disease, cancer, strokes, and even Alzheimer’s 
disease.4 Wine is also becoming a more and more sophisticated hobby and the increase in 
demand has been highlighted by an increase in better quality products, especially in 
Western Europe, Scandinavia, the United States and Australia. This could be explained in 
part by an increase in disposable income and living standards in the countries concerned. 
New wine markets in countries like China (having grown by 58% between 1996 and 
                                                
1 Jewish Virtual Library (http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org)
2 Euromonitor International (http://www.euromonitor.com)
3 The Wine Institute (http://www.wineinstitute.org)
4 Professional Friends of Wine (http://www.winepros.org)
22001),5 Russia, and South Korea (from 1993 to 1996, Korean wine imports nearly tripled, 
increasing from $5.9 million to $16.5 million)6 have also contributed significantly to the 
increased demand. New players in the wine production market such as South Africa and 
New Zealand have also contributed to an increasing world interest for this beverage. It is 
interesting to see however, that in certain Western European countries like France and 
Spain, consumers seemed to have moved away from the traditional every-day 
consumption of wine to a more occasional consumption (marked by a declining demand 
of 2.5% in the period of 2003).
In the United States, there has been a steady increase in demand, and it is estimated 
that the wine market contributed nearly 45$ billion to the US economy in 2003, as well as
creating 556,000 jobs. It is estimated that wineries have grown at a rate of 14%, leaving 
most states with over 25 wine producing companies,7 even though just over 50% of the 
American wineries are located in California.
The increased sophistication of wine has also increased the instances of consumers 
searching for rare and generally unavailable wines. This is where we see the growing role 
of wine auctioning in the expansion of the wine market. Wine auctions range from small, 
country-style wine fairs to immense and sometimes charity wine auctioning events. One 
of the largest American wine auctioning companies is the Napa Valley Auctions 
                                                
5 Research and Markets (http://www.researchandmarkets.com)
6 USDA Foreign Agricultural Service (http://www.fas.usda.gov)
7 Bloomington @ Work 
(http://www.journalism.indiana.edu/gallery/j201fall03/Bloomington@Work/KatieFinal)
3Company. This company has organized the largest charity event in the United States: the
Auction Napa Valley. Since its conception in 1981, this event has raised 62$ million for 
charity. In its more commercial auction, Premiere Napa Valley, the company has 
estimated a 28% increase in their revenues from the 2006 auction (vis-à-vis the 2005 
auction).8 Now with the Internet, everyday consumers can view and participate in various 
wine auctions on a multitude of online auction sites from their own home. Although these 
websites have grown at a rate to complement the dot-com boom of the 21st century, the 
caliber of most sites is not as impressive as traditional in-person auctions; the largest and 
most prestigious auction sales still occur in the traditional fashion.
The goal of this paper is to answer certain questions which become even more 
relevant with the growing demand for wine auctioning. The questions asked in this study 
will focus on the decisions which a wine auctioneer faces in deciding the makeup of the 
lots she wishes to auction off. 
In this paper, an auction is defined as a method of selling property in a public forum 
through open and competitive bidding. The word auction however will be used to denote 
the entire process in which lots are sold in an entire day. In other words, the combination 
of each individual lot sold constitutes an auction. 
The first issue focuses on the quantity-price ratio of wine sales. More specifically, is
it more profitable to sell wines by the bottle or in lots of several bottles (two bottles or a 
crate of six, twelve, or twenty-four)? Although according to certain economic theories, a 
                                                
8 Napa Valley Wineries (http://www.napavintners.com/auctions/premierenv.html)
4sale in bulk would lower the price paid per bottle,9 this is not necessarily true. Many 
factors such as the order of the lots or the amount of a particular vintage sold in one day 
can influence consumer’s willingness to pay as the auction runs its course. We can also 
hypothesize that the quality and rarity of the wine may cause an increase in its price per 
bottle. Wine lots which contain only one vintage in varying quantities will be referred to 
as a single-vintage lot.
The second issue deals with the profitability for the auction house to group different 
wines together, creating a multi-vintage lot. For example, could an auctioneer manage to 
increase the price per bottle by grouping a lower quality wine with a higher quality wine 
in a single lot? Would this increased price be higher than the price she would have 
received had she sold the wines individually? We will examine the profitability of these 
so called multi-vintage lots.
In the following sections, I will attempt to answer the above questions using an 
auction structure for which I have obtained raw live data. Section II will give a brief 
theoretical summary of the three most common auction types (English, Vickerey, and 
Dutch) and then focus on describing the auction of the Chicago Wine Company. Section 
III presents past studies published about the wine auctioning market. Section IV
examines the data obtained from the Chicago Wine Company and their manipulation. In 
Section V we will examine the price-quantity relationship for single-vintage lots by 
comparing study of averages to an ordinary least squares regression which takes into 
                                                
9 This is an example of second degree price discrimination.
5account the particular characteristics of the wines. Section VI examines the multi-vintage
issue using a probit model and a simple ordinary least squares regression. And finally, 
section VII presents the final observations and conclusions of the study.
6II. The Auction
Many wine auctioning companies use different procedures, each of which offer a 
variety of incentives for consumers and producers to do business with them. Each 
company will set its terms and conditions to appeal to a certain base-type of consumers. 
The framework we will analyze in this paper will be the auction structure used by the 
Chicago Wine Company (“the Company”) in their monthly auctioning system. In this 
system, the Company receives consignments of varying quantities of bottles from 
individual or corporate sellers. The Company decides to group the bottles in various 
different lot formats (single bottle, multi-bottle or multi-vintage) and determines the order 
in which they will be sold during the course of the entire auction. This paper attempts to 
examine the profitability of these decisions. 
In its formulation, the Company applies the English auction model. The English 
auction is a first-price, ascending-bid auction in which bidding continues until no bidder 
will go higher than the bid proposed by the auctioneer. The rules for an English auction 
are simple and the system has been used for over centuries by some of England’s oldest 
auction houses like Sotheby’s, Christie’s, and Phillips to provide the most efficient 
auctioning system for both the auctioneer and the consumers and producers. 
As we can expect, the auction system begins from a low bid set by the auctioneer and 
increases in increments specified by the auctioneer, until no participant is willing to bid 
7higher than the highest bid registered. When the bidding stops, the item or lot is said to be 
‘hammered down’ or ‘knocked down’ and the price at which this occurs is said to be the 
‘hammer price’. It is often assumed that when an item has been hammered down, it has 
been sold to the highest bidder, but this is not necessarily true. 
This is because before the auction takes place, the seller of the item or the auction 
house may set a ‘reserve price’. This reserve price is a minimum price which the seller 
accepts to sell the item. Therefore an item or lot which is hammered down before the 
reservation price is reached is unsold and is said to have been ‘bid in’. In wine 
auctioning, it has been observed by Ashenfelter (1989) that about 5 to 10 percent of lots 
are ‘bid in’. 
During an auction, every item will be treated, bid on, and knocked down as if it had 
been sold. It is only after the auction, upon collection of the item, that a buyer will know 
if the item or lot she was bidding on has been ‘bid in’. Thus, an auctioneer will never 
reveal the reservation price of an item or lot, as it would cause buyers to attempt to buy 
only just above this price to draw the maximum surplus away from the seller. When an 
item is bid in, the seller must wait a certain time before attempting to sell the item once 
again. It has been stated by Ashenfelter (1989) that the repeated auctioning of a certain 
item or lot may cause its future value to diminish. When this occurs, an item is said to 
have been ‘burned’.10
                                                
10 Ashenfelter. How auctions Work for Wine and Art
8It is a common misconception that the auctioneer will begin the bidding at the reserve 
price. The auctioneer will generally start the bid at a level she deems reasonable, and this 
is generally (by contract) left entirely to her discretion. Another misconception about the 
power of the auctioneer is that she can, usually at the end of the sale of an item or lot, 
invent fictitious bids to extract the maximum from the buyers (as stated by Graham and 
Marshall (1987)). This is not only unethical, but also quite illegal and since the rules of 
the auctioneer are available to the public, such behavior would not be tolerated long. 
Since an auction houses most important asset is its reputation, no well-known auction 
house would engage in such practices. The auction business is an example of an industry 
where the reputation of an auction house can serve as a significant barrier to entry to 
competitors.
Of equal importance but often ignored in economic literature, is the role of the 
auctioneer in the auction process. The auctioneer is the dominant party in the process, and 
is the key which makes the auction engine run. In a perfectly rational economic structure, 
the auctioneer would play no role whatsoever. Buyers would all pay their willingness’s to 
pay and sellers would set their reserve price to obtain their desired profit. 
However, reality suggests otherwise. The job of the auctioneer is to draw the buyers 
into the game, to extract the highest valuation from them, but at the same time to allow 
the customers to feel relaxed so as to feel like they have gotten a fair deal. Many 
consumers believe that the auctioneer acts on behalf of the seller, but this is not 
9necessarily true. Since the auctioneer receives compensation from both the buyer and the 
seller, it can be said that she acts in her own best interest. 
A buyer’s premium (implemented by most auctions) is a sum charged to the buyer of 
an item or lot to act as commission to the company selling the good (usually a fixed 
percentage). A buyer’s premium causes the willingness to pay of a consumer to be 
diminished as the consumer has the knowledge that the final price she will be paying is 
not the price she bids11.
The seller’s commission is a sum charged by the auction house to sell the good (also 
usually a percentage). Generally the size of this seller’s commission is not fixed, and is 
negotiable based on the relationship between the seller and the auctioneer and the size of 
the consignment (the total amount of wine a seller wishes to sell). 
According to Ashenfelter (1989), in the recent years, the auction business has 
progressed such that auction houses experience greater profits manipulating the buyer’s 
premiums rather than seller’s commissions due to the fact that they usually deal with 
large consigners who can bargain down the seller’s commission. This is not necessarily 
the case. Since a large buyer’s premium can reduce the willingness to pay of a consumer 
it may thus increase the chance of a lot being ‘bid in’. A good or lot which has been ‘bid 
in’ brings neither a premium nor commission to the auctioneer. Therefore, to make sure 
the auction house still profits from bid in items, there is usually a fee for unsold goods, 
generally expressed as a percentage of the reserve price. This is an important strategic 
                                                
11 Townsend Real Estate (http://www.townsend-real-estate.com/Buyers_Premium.htm)
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consideration when setting the reserve price. This is logical as making the fee a function 
of the reserve price will cause sellers to risk less by setting a lower reserve price, causing 
the item or lot to be more likely to sell.
The English auction is not the only commonly used auction system. We will briefly 
examine two other auction systems which are also used in wine and art auctioning: the 
Vickerey auction and the Dutch auction.
The Vickerey auction is a non ascending secret bid auction in which all bidders write 
their bids on ballots which are collected by the auctioneer. The auctioneer then examines 
the bids and the winner is chosen to be the bidder who bid the most. The Vickerey 
auction is also known as a second-price auction because the winner of the lot will only 
pay the second highest bid. In this auction, as demonstrated by to the Nobel Prize 
winning economist William Vickerey, the Nash equilibrium results when the bidders bid 
their true willingness to pay, knowing that they will only end up paying the second 
highest bid. All bidders thus have a dominant strategy to bid their willingness to pay.
Another common type of auction is the Dutch auction. This auction is called a 
descending price auction as the starting bid usually starts at quite a high level. The 
auctioneer then decreases the price gradually until a bidder tells him to stop. This bidder 
will then win the lot and pay the price at which the auctioneer stopped. Dutch auctions 
are usually characterized by the speed of the auction process, and are very common in 
bulk flower auctions. 
11
The Company auction is similar to the English auction described previously, with a 
few specifications and refinements. All of the lots to be auctioned off are advertised in a 
free catalogue which can be ordered prior to the auction. The Company reserves the right 
to withdraw any lot prior to or during the auction for whatever reason. Anyone above the 
age of 21 can register with the Company prior to the auction if they wish to participate in 
the live bid. Absentee bids may be placed by mail, e-mail, telephone, or fax, before the 
auction. These bids will be executed by the Company at or below a specified price, and 
the Company is not held liable for the failure to place any of these bids or any other 
errors relating to the execution of such bids. This stated, an absentee bidder can request 
that the Company limit her overall expenditures in the auction to a pre-determined limit. 
If this request is made, the Company will cease bidding on all lots once the absentee 
bidder reaches the predetermined limit. All bidding in the live auction is done with 
paddles only. The highest bidder acknowledged by the auctioneer will be the winner of 
the lot. The auctioneer holds the authority to reject any bid and to advance the bidding. In 
the event of an argument between bidders, the auctioneer reserves the right to determine 
the successful bidder or to resell the item in dispute. For all arguments which follow the 
auction, the final sale shall be the winner as determined by the Company auctioneer. All 
bidding will be done in accordance with the bidding increments published by the 
Company in its catalogues prior to the auction. The increments are as follows.
12
Table 1: Bidding increments of the Chicago Wine Company auction
Range Increment Example
$10 $200 $10 $110, $120, $130
$200 $1,000 $20 $220, $240, $260
$1,000 $2,000 $50 $1050, $1100, $1150
$2,000 $5,000 $100 $2100, $2200, $2300
$5,000 $10,000 $200 $5200, $5400, $5600
Over $10000 $500 $10500, $11000, $11500
Source: The Chicago Wine Company: Terms and Conditions (www.tcwc.com/terms.htm)
The auctioneer reserves the right to change the bidding increments at any time. 
The hammer price of a lot will be the purchase price. The Company does not charge a 
buyer’s premium. In actual fact, the Company is the only large live auction house in the 
United States which does not have a buyer’s premium. Although a lot may reach a final 
selling price, a seller or the auctioneer may, as stated earlier, implement a reserve during 
the course of the entire auction (not the single lot auction). All charges such as the 
relevant sales taxes and other charges which the Company is required by law to collect 
will be imposed on the hammer price of the lot. This being stated, the Federal Excise Tax 
(currently of 18 cents per 750 ml bottle) is absorbed by the Company and will not be 
charged to the buyer. No lots are to be taken away or shipped until the auction has ended 
and until the purchase price has been paid in full. All shipments made by the Company 
must be in accordance to the laws of the origin and destination involved. Many states in 
the USA have laws to regulate the flow of alcoholic beverages. The Company agrees to 
13
assist with any shipping request made by the buyers, with the understanding that all 
arrangements are made by the buyer himself and thus all plaints for damages are to be 
made to the shipping company and not the Company. All auctions sold by the Company 
are sold as is, and thus no warranties of any nature exist. The Company also charges no 
lotting and no lot collection fees, which are costs to the seller and buyer respectively, 
which accompany selling and buying a lot. In addition the Company does not charge an 
automatic 1% insurance rate which many auctioning companies will require.12
As for the seller, The Company charges a 28% seller’s commission. Thus, of the 
hammer price of the lot, The Company receives 28% and the consigner receives 72%
(after the respective taxes and duties stated in the terms and conditions are accounted 
for). For example, if a lot were to sell for $200, The Company would receive $56 and the 
consigner would receive $144 (ignoring the taxes and duties). This percentage is 
negotiable and may vary depending on the size of the consignment a particular seller 
wishes to sell and the relationship which exists between The Company and the consigner. 
                                                
12 The Chicago Wine Company (www.tcwc.com)
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III. Past Research
In this section, I will examine other studies which have been conducted on wine 
auctioning and wine prices to build the scene for my analysis. Although not much 
research has been done in the field of wine auctioning, two studies were chosen which 
will allow us to examine certain findings of other economists and their implications on 
the global state of the wine auctioning market. Two studies will be examined; the first 
dealing with the concerns of consumer information in wine auctions and how personal 
consumer characteristics affect reserve prices. The second study deals with price 
evolution in US, Danish and international markets, and the effect of business cycle 
indicators on the latter.
The first paper examined is a study written by Lecocq, Magnac, Pichery and Visser
(2003) which consists of a simulated experiment in which individuals endowed with 
varying degrees of information were randomly placed in three separate rooms and 
informed about the characteristics and quality of certain wines. The participants were 
then given the chance to evaluate the wines which were sequentially auctioned off in four 
separate Vickerey auctions.
The authors then examined certain personal characteristics of the individuals and 
attempted to draw conclusions about how these characteristics affected their behavior and 
more importantly their willingness to pay. This article yielded interesting conclusions.
15
The authors noticed that certain socio-economic characteristics such as gender, income, 
and consumption habits affected significantly a person’s willingness to pay, and others 
such as age and nationality played no role. Also, varying the type of information that 
individuals disposed of showed some interesting results. The authors found that when 
participants who entered the experiment had prior knowledge of the quality and 
characteristics of the wine to be evaluated, tasting the wine had no effect whatsoever in 
changing their willingness to pay. 
They also found that if participants who had no prior knowledge tasted the wines 
blindly and were advised by an expert who informed them of the characteristics and 
opinions of the wines in question, their willingness to pay increased dramatically. This 
leads to an interesting conclusion which shows that even if a participant has never tasted 
the wine in question, the opinion of a “professional”, be it a wine guide or an expert, 
would be sufficient in increasing their willingness to pay. Information made available 
from “professionals” is thus more reliable than personal perceptions and opinions of the 
blind tasting. 
The explanation of the authors is the following: a wine can be assumed to be a bundle 
of characteristics and attributes. These attributes can be divided into two groups, search 
and experience or sensory attributes. Search attributes can be evaluated by a consumer by 
examining the label or consulting a wine guide or expert, where as the sensory 
characteristics can only be obtained through tasting the wine. Assuming that none of the 
participants in the experiment were experts, we can assume that the sensory attributes are 
16
difficult to observe by the agents and thus it would be difficult for them to observe the 
actual quality of the wine. The best technique for the agents to gain a good knowledge of 
the wine quality is by listening to the experts and the guides, and therefore to suppress 
their experience perceptions of the wine. 
Search attributes thus preside over sensory attributes in explaining the willingness to 
pay.
In a paper published by Bentzen and Smith (2003), their focus lay in the comparison 
and evolution of the price of a particular wine, the Mouton Rothschild premier cru classé, 
a Bordeaux wine from the region of Pauillac. The paper begins by gathering data on the 
price of the Mouton Rothschild (1982) from several auction houses worldwide and 
comparing them to attempt to study the price difference across countries. Next the 
authors attempt to find a link between the prices of these wines and certain business cycle 
indicators. 
The first interesting result of this paper comes when the authors examine data 
provided to them by the Chicago Wine Company and find that the average price per 
bottle of the Mouton Rothschild 1982 actually increases as the size of the lot increases. 
They hypothesize that this trend could be in part due to the fact that large lots are more 
professionally stored than individual bottles. Also they state that in many cases, the large 
lots are sold in their original wood cases. I conducted a very similar study on three 
different wines, the Chateau Mouton Rothschild 1998, the Chateau Lafite Rothschild 
17
1998 and the Chateau Latour 1995, and obtained similar conclusions as Bentzen and 
Smith. These results will be exhibited in Section V (See Table 4).
The paper continues to compare the price of the wine in the USA, Denmark, England 
and the rest of the world. The authors note that prices seem to vary quite dramatically 
across countries. This effect could be attributed in part to the fact that fine wines, such as 
the wine studied, are in less demand in Denmark than in the United States. This affect 
could also be attributed to the varying taxes which apply to the sale of alcohols in the 
respective countries.
The main goal of the paper was to compare certain business cycle indicators to the 
international price of the icon wine and to attempt to find a link between the two. The 
conclusion of this analysis was that even when a broad range of economic indicators were 
used, no significant link was found between the movements of the Mouton Rothschild
1982 and the movements of these indicators. 
The study was particularly interesting due to its similarity with the questions asked in 
this paper. Both the price per bottle and financial indicators analysis coincide with 
aspects which this paper will examine. Moreover, the primary source of data for Bentzen 
and Smith was the Chicago Wine Company, which is the source of the results to be 
shown later. Our studies differ however, in the respect that I focus on the decisions made 
by the auctioneer in determining the final price whereas Bentzen and Smith examined 
only the final sale prices.
18
IV. The Data
The data used in this paper is obtained from the Chicago Wine Company auctions. 
These nearly monthly auctions were recorded, and the hammer prices, lot numbers, and 
wine quantities, sizes, and descriptions were all noted. I use data from auction number 
329 on January 28, 2004 to auction number 343 on December 21, 2004 (11 auctions in 
total: there was none in the month of October). Each observation in the data corresponds 
to one specific lot, be it a single-vintage or a multi-vintage lot. This being said, certain 
characteristics of single-vintage lots are not applicable to multi-vintage lots and vice 
versa. The data set was compiled to include only French Bordeaux red wines, even 
though The Company holds auctions for many different wines. The decision to only 
observe red wines from this region was made to obtain a homogenous data set of wines. 
The wines varied amongst a set of specific characteristics such as quality, year, and 
physical condition (explained later). This amounted to 10,425 individual lots sold. After a 
brief analysis, it was noted that 13.36% of the lots sold consisted of single unit lots or 
more specifically, lots which only contained one bottle of wine. 
Since the modern ages of wine production, the Bordeaux region in France has been 
one of the most prestigious wine-producing regions in the world. From its vineyards have 
come some of the highest quality and most valued wines along with a history and 
tradition of excellence. In 2003, the Bordeaux region’s 57 appellations and roughly 7,000 
19
chateau’s produced 779.3 million bottles of wine,13 accounting for 25% of the high 
quality wine production in France.14 We can consider that the Bordeaux region can 
generally be divided geographically into four wine-producing regions. Within these
regions, fifteen sub-regions15 have been distinguished (Figure 2 in the annex shows all 
the Bordeaux regions, not just the ones which appeared in the data) as the quality and 
characteristics of a wine will most certainly vary across the regions of Bordeaux. 
The largest of these greater-regions is the Rivers region, which includes the massive 
Bordeaux Supèrieur sub-region, which spreads over 51400 hectares. In its entirety, the 
Bordeaux Supèrieur sub-region produced nearly 62% of the entire Bordeaux wine 
product (475 million bottles) in 2003 (see Table II in annex). Although this area is by far 
the largest sub-region, we find very little mention of it in the data set observed. This is 
largely due to the fact that the wines produced from this region are not as high quality as 
the wines produced in the other sub-regions. Probably the most common greater-region in 
our sample would be the Côtes region. This area (which accounts for only 13.43% of the 
Bordeaux production) contains the very prestigious Pomerol and St. Emilion sub-regions. 
As we shall see later, the majority of the wines in our data sample originate from this 
greater-region (see Table III in annex). The smallest greater-region, Graves, is fairly 
present in the data, mostly because of wines from the Pessac-Lèognan sub-region, which 
                                                
13 Total includes both red and white wines
14 In this case “high quality” is used to describe AOC (Appellation Origine Controlée) appellations. These 
appellations are considered by wine experts as the highest quality wine producers in the country. 
Terroir-France (http://www.terroir-france.com)
15 It is important to note that more than 15 sub-regions exist (21 actually) in the Bordeaux area, but only 15 
were specified because only wines from these 15 sub-regions were found present in the Chicago Wine 
Company data.
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produces several fine wines. It is interesting to note that the sub-region of Sauternes in 
the Graves area is a region which produces only sweet white wines. There are therefore 
no observations in our data originating from this region. The last greater-region is the 
region of Médoc. This area is common in the data as well, but perhaps not as common as 
the Côtes area. The greater-region of Médoc contains many of the finest French wineries, 
including those from the Pauillac sub-region. Throughout the world, Pauillac is 
considered as one of the sub-regions in which the best Bordeaux wines are produced (See 
Figures 4-8 and Tables I and II in annex for additional details). 
To account for this specification of sub-regions, dummy variables were created for 
each lot which categorized the place of origin of the particular wine. As stated earlier, the 
Bordeaux sector was divided into fifteen individual sub-regions. Fourteen dummy 
variables were thus generated, one sub-region being excluded to act as the zero-condition 
region (the sub-region of Bordeaux Supérieur). Since multi-vintage lots can contain 
bottles of wine from different regions, these regional dummies are not employed in their 
case. Different binary variables were thus generated to exhibit the decisions made by the 
auctioneer to group the wines together in a multi-vintage format. The first variable 
specifies if the wines in the multi-vintage lot are of the same year, the second specifies if 
the wines are produced by the same chateau, and the third specifies if the wines are from 
the same region in the Bordeaux sector. 
The data set was also trimmed to include only bottles of the classic 0.75 liter size. All 
other bottles of magnum size or higher (including double magnums, imperials, 
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jeroboams, and salmanazars; see Figure 3 in annex) were removed from the sample. This 
decision was made to ensure the stability of the quantity variable, allowing it to vary per 
observation based on the assumption that all the bottles were of the same size. 
For example a lot of two 0.75 liter bottles is not necessarily equal to a lot of a single 
magnum-sized bottle as the individual bottles can be consumed at different times, thus 
increasing their value to the personal consumer. This may cause magnum-sized bottles to 
be less expensive due the lack of demand. On the other hand, magnum and larger size 
bottles are often purchased for prestigious events as they must be consumed entirely in 
one session, and thus may sometimes be more valued for their rarity.
Next, a quality of wines variable was also employed. This variable was not generated 
from the data obtained from the Company, but was drawn from the extremely well 
known Parker wine ratings (www.erobertparker.com). These ratings are renowned and 
are considered the top wine ranking benchmark in the world. The wines were rated on a 
scale from 0 to 100, judged professionally by their taste, odor and color. Since the data 
sample consists of lots that are both single-vintage and multi-vintage, this variable will 
only be used in its raw form in the single-vintage case. In the multi-vintage case, the 
quality is expressed as the average quality of all of the bottles in the lot.  
An age variable was then generated using the year the wine was produced. This age 
variable was calculated by setting the base year to 2003, since the newest wines sold in 
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the auctions (which were held in 2004) were from this year. In the multi-vintage case, 
this variable is not used. 
The next variables generated were order variables which rank the lots observed in the 
order in which they were auctioned off during the day of a particular auction. This is 
important to see if the price of a lot depended on whether it was sold earlier or later in the 
auction. This variable is simply expressed as a number where the first lot auctioned off 
takes value one and so on. In other words, the order variable resets for every auction (the 
auction being the full day). This variable was generated independently for single-vintage
lots and multi-vintage lots. This being said, the order variable in the single-vintage case 
represents the order in which the single-vintage lots were sold during the course of an 
auction. The same applies for the multi-vintage order variable.
Another similar variable generated is a global order variable. This parameter is 
similar to the first order variable except that it does not reset per auction. Thus, the global 
order variable is simply a numerical progression which indicates the chronological order 
in which the lots were sold over the period of a year, throughout all eleven auctions. This 
variable is found only to be significant in the multi-vintage case; therefore it is not 
present in single-vintage observations.
Similar to this, another variable was generated to state the amount of bottles of the 
particular wine (same year and vintage) which was sold on that day. This variable 
suggests that the sale of many bottles of a particularly good wine in a single auction could 
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have detrimental effects on its price. Since buyers at the auction have perfect knowledge 
of all the wines to be auctioned off on a given day, a large supply of a particular wine 
may cause its price for that day to fall. This variable was only used in the single-vintage
case.
The next variables generated are dummy variables which serve to explain the 
condition of the physical bottles of wine. These variables were all manually generated 
based on a description of each lot provided by The Company. Since many wines are 
stored in humid cellars and are often left for long periods unmonitored it is not 
uncommon that the physical bottle or the wine itself maybe be damaged. Damage to the 
wine label, the cap, the cork, or sometimes even the bottle itself can have a detrimental 
effect on the final price paid by consumers.
The following eleven discreet variables describe physical effects (mostly presumed to 
be detrimental) to the bottle or the wine in question. These physical effects could affect 
the willingness to pay of the consumer. A label-damage conditional was generated to 
show that bottles with varying degrees of damaged labels are worth less per bottle than 
undamaged bottles. The value of this variable ranged from 0 to 3, taking the value 3 when 
the label was most damaged, and the value 0 when the label was in good condition. A 
variable was also created to take into account if a bottle had its label replaced. Next, three 
cork binary variables were created to show the position of the cork (depressed or raised) 
and if the bottle has been re-corked. The next three variables, also binary, deal with the 
condition of the cap on the wine (whether the cap is corroded, nicked, or even if there is 
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no cap at all). Another variable deals with the shoulder fill or level of wine in the bottle. 
The level generally varies based on a combination of the age of the wine and the storage 
conditions in which the wine was kept. A wine with a low shoulder fill is often a mark of 
very poor storage and can be in many cases, undrinkable. Conversely, a high shoulder fill 
is a good fill level for bottles which are more than 25 years of age. A mid shoulder fill 
can be an indicator of poor storage and can result in a bottle being undrinkable, although 
this fill level is common in wines which are more than 40 years of age. These details are 
very important to keep in mind when purchasing old wines. This qualitative variable has 
a value range of 1 to -2, taking the value -2 when the bottle in question shows a low fill,
and the value 1 when a bottle shows a high fill. When the variable is of value 0, the bottle 
is of normal fill. The next variable accounts for the presence of sediment in a wine. 
Sediment is often considered an indication of poor storage or unprofessional wine 
fermentation, yet this is usually false. Sediment is often the result of natural wine aging, 
and can, in many cases, be considered a good sign. It can also result from a wine not 
being filtered before being bottled. Sediment is not harmful in any ways, and can be 
removed by simply decanting the wine before consuming it. The final conditional 
variable is binary and deals with the presence of a Balthus label. In the early 1990’s the 
Mouton Rothschild wine producing estate hired an artist by the name of Balthus to design 
the label of the 1993 wine and produce a series labels for different vintages. After having 
been distributed, these labels were removed from the market for their slightly revealing 
images which included mild nudity. Because of the rarity, these bottles are sought after 
by wine collectors. 
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Since these physical effects can arise in only particular bottles in a crate (say one 
bottle in a crate of twelve is damaged) a method to account for this had to be 
implemented. The value of these discreet variables equaled the average of the 
corresponding dummy variable for each of the bottles in the lot. For example, if a crate of 
twelve bottles contained two bottles with sediment, then the sediment dummy would 
have a value of 0.167. In the case of multi-vintage lots, these binary variables are not 
employed. This is due to the fact that examination of the data showed that all the bottles 
included in multi-vintage lots were in pristine condition and had none of the particular 
traits listed above. These variables are thus only considered in the single-vintage case.
The important variables will be summarized in the following tables, firstly for the 
single-vintage case, then the multi-vintage case.
Table 2: Summary of important variables for single-vintage lots
Variable Mean Std. Dev Median Min Max
Price 974.399 1471.461 560 10 24000
Price per Bottle 229.36 462.21 110 10 8200
Quantity 6.325 4.664 6 1 24
Quality 93.004 4.302 93 62 100
Age 9.694 12.346 5 0 110
Data: The Chicago Wine Company (www.tcwc.com)
From Table 2, we can see a few important features of the data used in this analysis. 
First, we notice that prices in the 11 auctions gathered range from $10 to $24000 (USD) 
for a single lot. What is interesting to note is the high standard deviation of the price 
which is an indicator that the prices of many of the lots were very volatile. This is not 
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surprising as lots varied in size from single bottle lots to crates of 24 (as we can see from 
the quantity variable). The average of the quantity variable shows us that the average lot 
sold consisted of roughly six bottles of wine and the average price of these lots were of 
$974.4. We can see from average price variable that the average price paid by buyers per 
bottle was of $229.36. These prices for individual bottles ranged from $10 to $8200. We 
can see a fairly high standard deviation, which exhibits a similar high variation we saw in 
the price per lot. The Quality variable ranges from 62 to 100, which serves to show that 
the wines studied ranged from mediocre quality wines to wines of very high quality. The 
average quality of 93 combined with the average price per bottle for the wines from the 
Bordeaux region is a very good indicator of the overall quality of the wines produced in 
this region, which are truly among the best in the world. We can also see the age variable 
ranges from 0 to 110. This indicates to us that the sample’s oldest wine dates back to 
1893, and the newest wines are from 2003. The mean age of the wines is roughly 10, 
which means wines from 1993. This as well as a fairly high variance, indicates to us that 
there exist outliers in the lower boundary which must be dealt with. 
Table 3: Summary of important variables for multi-vintage lots
Variable Mean Std. Dev Median Min Max
Lot Price 295.369 464.060 180 30 4600
Lot Value 353.265 483.979 240 60 4035
Quantity 3.943 2.927 3 2 23
High Value 129.391 164.992 90 20 1600
Low Value 61.783 30.343 60 20 150
High Quality 90.787 3.847 91 80 100
Low Quality 85.631 5.955 86.5 50 95
Same Year 0.631 0.484 1 0 1
Same Chateau 0.123 0.330 0 0 1
Same Region 0.336 0.474 0 0 1
Data: The Chicago Wine Company (www.tcwc.com)
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From the above summary, we can point out a few interesting characteristics of the 
data. Firstly we can see the high standard deviation associated with prices, as mentioned 
before. The lot price variable describes the price paid for a multi-vintage lot, and the lot 
value variable shows the compiled value of that lot. This value is calculated by finding
the prices that a buyer could have paid had she bought the individual bottles at the same 
auction, rather than the multi-vintage lot. It is extremely important to note that since all 
the bottles sold in multi-vintage lots were in pristine condition (they exhibited no sign of 
the conditional variables described earlier), the value variable is drawn from identical 
bottles, or more specifically, pristine bottles. This thus explains why no conditional
variables are use in the multi-vintage case. The average price of a multi-vintage lot was 
of $295. Conversely, the average value of a multi-vintage lot was of $353. This shows us 
that, on average, multi-vintage lots were under valued. The median statistic supports this 
result. The Quantity variable here tells us that the average number of bottles in a multi-
vintage lot was roughly 4. The final 3 variables show us the decisions made by the 
auction house in creating multi-vintage lot. According to the data, 61% of the multi-
vintage lots contained bottles of the same year, 12% contained bottles from the same 
chateau, and 33% contained bottles from the same region.
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V. The Quantity-Price Ratio Model
Before an econometric analysis was run on the data gathered, a short study on price 
per bottle of three specific Bordeaux wines was carried out. This analysis was conducted 
in the attempt to show that comparing averages can yield different conclusions than a 
more specific study which takes into account the characteristics of the wines. These three 
wines, the Chateau Mouton Rothschild 1998, the Chateau Lafite Rothschild 1998, and the 
Chateau Latour 1995, were chosen because of the fact that they are wines that sell in 
varied quantities (from one bottle to a case of 24) due to their popularity. These three 
wines are also wines of very similar quality (96, 98, and 96 respectively). Table 4 shows 
the variation in the price per bottle according to the size of the lot. 
Table 4: Average prices per bottle of three selected Bordeaux wines per lot 
size
Data: The Chicago Wine Company (www.tcwc.com) 
Average price per bottle
Lot size
Ch. Mouton Rothschild 1998 Ch. Lafite Rothschild 1998 Ch. Latour 1995
1 120 156.67 220
2 150.63 168.18 255.83
4 154.62 169.62 258.93
6 152.22 160 266.67
12 155.95 169.91 260.42
24 155.9 175 291.67
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Table 4 shows a tendency towards increasing price per bottle with respect to lot size 
(see Figure 1 in annex for graphical results). This result shows us that when averages are 
concerned, the price per bottle will be greater as the lot size increases. 
This exhibits the same conclusions as the study conducted by Bentzen and Smith 
(2003). They conclude that this result is explainable by the fact that large lots are, on 
average, stored more professionally than small lots or single bottles, and are thus more 
desirable.16 We can also hypothesize that there exists a transaction cost (time spent at the 
auction) in the purchase of many individual lots versus the purchase of one single large 
lot. 
The goal of this study is to attempt show that if we only consider the averages and not 
the particular characteristics of the wine, we may obtain erroneous conclusions.
An Econometric model was then specified to see if, when the particular 
characteristics of the wines are taken into account, we obtain the same result exhibited in 
the average study conducted above. The estimation of the model was done using an 
ordinary least squares regression with a log-level framework. Examination of the data 
confirmed the presence of quite a few large important outliers which needed to be 
accommodated for. The log of the price per bottle was thus used to account for these 
outliers.
                                                
16
Bentzen and Smith. A Comparative Study of Wine Auction Prices: Mouton Rothschild Premier Cru 
Classé
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Log(priceperbottle) = α0 + α1quantity + α2order + α3numsold + α4quality + α5lnage + 
β + ΓC + 
Where  is the vector of regional dummies and C is a vector of discreet condition 
variables, and α1 represents the semi-elasticity of price per bottle with respect to 
quantity.17
The following presents the results of the previous model. Two separate regressions 
are presented, one using the main framework described above, and the other including 
two interaction terms between important variables which lead to slightly different 
conclusions. 
When the original regressions were constructed, a Breusch-Pagan test for 
heteroskedasticity was conducted on each. The null hypothesis of homoskedasticity was 
rejected in both, thus confirming the presence of heteroskedasticity. To account for this, 
the regressions were both conducted using heteroskedastic robust standard errors. 
                                                
17 In actual fact, in a log-level model, the semi-elasticity is denoted as 100*α1 as it shows the % change in 
price per bottle with respect to a change in quantity.
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Table 5: Regression output of log-level model
Explanatory Variable Estimate Std.Error Explanatory Variable Estimate Std.Error
Quantity -0.021* (0.0017) Label Condition -0.054* (0.0155)
Order 0.0001* (0.00003) Relabled -0.449* (0.1219)
Number sold -0.002* (0.0005) Recorked 1.211* (0.0906)
Quality 0.131* (0.0017) Depressed cork -0.164 (0.1210)
Age 0.455* (0.0123) Raised cork 0.255 (0.2513)
Corroded capsule 0.195* (0.0765)
Cotes de Bourg 0.400* (0.1724) Damaged capsule -0.082 (0.0857)
Cotes de Castillon 0.437* (0.1661) No capsule 2.109* (0.2878)
Fronsac 0.208 (0.1744) Fill level 0.208* (0.0441)
Graves 1.529* (0.1660) Sediment 2.403* (0.3453)
Haut Medoc 0.466* (0.1683) Balthus labels 0.080 (0.1182)
Margaux 1.296* (0.1503) Constant -9.235* (0.2153)
Medoc 0.096 (0.2000)
Pauillac 1.233* (0.1492) R-squared 0.6621
Pessac-Leognan 1.123* (0.1499) Root MSE 0.5720
Pomerol 1.348* (0.1489)
Premieres Cotes de Bordeaux 0.032 (0.1749)
St. Emilion 1.084* (0.1486)
St. Estephe 0.860* (0.1515)
St. Julien 0.851* (0.1502)
* significant at 5%
Data: The Chicago Wine Company (www.tcwc.com)
In the first model, we find that many of the coefficients have the expected signs. 
Firstly, the quantity variable is negative. This shows that increasing the amount of bottles 
in a lot will decrease the overall price per bottle of the lot. This does not coincide with the 
result shown in the averages study above (Table 4). 
This outcome is extremely important as it shows that failing to take into account the 
characteristics of the wines will lead to a result which is false. The coefficient tells us 
that, ceteris paribus, increasing the size of the lot by one bottle will decrease the price 
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paid per bottle in that lot by 2.1%.18 Although this result is statistically significant, its 
economic significance is better explained when examining the price per bottle in large 
lots rather than in small lots.
All other things equal, increasing a 6 bottle lot to a 12 bottle lot would decrease the 
price per bottle by 12.6%. Similarly, increasing a 12 bottle lot to a 24 bottle lot would 
decrease the price per bottle by 25.2%. In other words, if a 12 bottle lot was priced at 
$1200 ($100 per bottle), adding 12 bottles of the same wine to the lot would cause the lot 
price to be $1795.20 ($74.8 per bottle), all other things remaining equal. A brief 
experiment (results not shown here) was conducted to attempt to establish a non-linear 
link between the price per bottle and the quantity. The results showed that there existed 
no such non-linear link. 
The expected sign of the order variable is not necessarily clear. One could expect that 
the later in the auction that the lot was sold, the less the seller would obtain per bottle.
However this is not always the case. The order variable is positive, which is 
explainable by the fact that in the Chicago Wine Company auctions, the more expensive
lots are sold at the end of an auction. This would mean that, other factors remaining 
constant, the price per bottle of any lot would be higher if it was sold at the end of an 
auction. 
                                                
18 Calculated using: %y = 100*1x
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The sign of the total number sold variable, however, is expected and clear. The 
coefficient states that for every bottle of a particular vintage and year sold on the given 
day of an auction, the price paid per bottle of that wine decreases by 0.2%. This result 
shows that if there is a large supply of a particular wine on a particular day, the 
consumers will pay less per bottle. 
The quality variable is another variable whose coefficient bears the expected sign. It 
states that, each unit of quality increases the price per bottle of a wine by 13.1%. For 
example, if we were to compare two wines, one of quality 80 and the other of 100,  (all 
other factors remaining equal) the second wine would, cost roughly twice as much (262% 
more) per bottle than the first. 
It was noted above that the age variable was susceptible to outliers due to its low 
average but quite high maximum value. For this purpose, the age variable was used in log 
form to take into account these outliers. Its coefficient also has the expected sign, stating 
that the more a wine has aged, the greater the price paid per bottle, ceteris paribus. 
In a separate regression (not shown here), an attempt was made to find the existence 
of a non-linear relationship between price per bottle and age. This could show that as 
wines pass their prime drinkable age, their price per bottle increases by less than before. 
This effect could not be identified. This is possibly explainable by the fact that wines past 
their prime can still retain their value as collector’s items, rather than a drinkable product.
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The variables that follow are the regional binaries. Their values yield very simple 
conclusions. The region which was set as being the zero condition is the region of 
Bordeaux Supérieur, thus the magnitudes of the dummy variables simply state whether 
wines from the given region cost more or less per bottle than wines from the Bordeaux 
Supérieur region, all else being equal. For example, the data set tells us that a wine from 
the region of Pauillac would cost 75% more per bottle than a wine with the exact same 
characteristics from the Bordeaux Supérieur. We can see that all of the regional dummies 
are positive since wines from the Bordeaux Supérieur are lower priced, and only three are 
not significant at the 5% level. 
The next variables to be analyzed are the collection of discreet conditional variables.
Although many of the coefficients of these variables show the expected signs, a few go 
against what could be expected. 
The label damage conditional shows a negative coefficient, which explains that 
bottles with varying degrees of damaged labels are worth less per bottle than undamaged 
bottles. This is the expected sign. The coefficient tells us that, ceteris paribus, a bottle of 
wine with a very slightly damaged label will have its price per bottle reduced by 5.4%. 
Similarly, a bottle with a slightly more damaged label will be worth 10.8% less per bottle 
and a wine bottle with a very damaged label will be worth 16.2% less. The Relabeled 
variable, also negative, tells us that a wine bottle which has been relabeled is worth 45% 
less per bottle, all other things remaining equal.
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The three cork conditional variables bear varied conclusions. Although the depressed 
and raised cork variables are insignificant, they bear the expected signs. The surprising 
result is that the coefficient of the variable which deals with a re-corked wine is positive 
and significant. This would mean that re-corking a wine would increase its value per 
bottle versus exact non re-corked bottles (by 121% per bottle), ceteris paribus. 
Of the next three variables which deal with the condition of the cap on the wine, two
yield positive coefficients, which is not expected. Two of these variables, the corroded 
cap and the no cap variables are significant at the 5% level. A possible explanation for 
this is that upon analysis of the data, it seems that capsule damage occurs only in 
expensive and high quality wines. Since the price of these is fairly volatile and their 
appearance on the auction market can be rare, buyers may tend to overlook a damaged 
capsule or the fact that a capsule is missing when placing their bids on the wine(s).
The sign of the coefficient of the shoulder fill variable is as expected, and it is 
significant at a 5% level. As explained earlier, the fill variable ranged from 1 to -2, 
equaling 1 if the bottles exhibited a high shoulder fill, 0 if the fill was normal, -1 if the fill 
was medium shoulder, and -2 if the fill was low. The coefficient indicates that a bottle 
with low shoulder fill is worth 41.6% less per bottle than an exactly similar bottle with a 
normal shoulder fill. Similarly, a bottle with a mid shoulder fill is worth 20.8% less per 
bottle. Conversely, we can see that, ceteris paribus, a bottle with a high shoulder fill will 
cost 20.8% more per bottle. This result is important as it distinguishes that there is a real 
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price difference between aged wines which have been well stored and wines which have 
been poorly maintained. 
Another variable which yields an expected and logical sign is the variable which 
indicates the presence of sediment in the wines. The variable is significant at the 5% level 
and its magnitude shows that a wine with sediment is worth 240% more per bottle than a 
wine without sediment, all other things held constant. 
The Balthus binary included in the regression yields a positive coefficient, which is 
insignificant at the 5% level. 
Finally, the interpretation of the constant is simple. The constant, which is significant 
at the 5% level, can be described as the price of a wine which exhibits none of the 
physical characteristics stated above and which originates from the region of Bordeaux 
Supérieur and which was produced in the base year, 2003. 
The first model overall shows a strong R2 of 0.66 which confirms a good overall 
significance of variables. 
The previous regression successfully showed that if we take into considerations the 
particular characteristics of the wines being sold, that we would obtain a different 
conclusion that the averages study conducted at the beginning of this section. It was 
found that increasing the amount of bottles sold in a lot decreased the price per bottle of 
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that lot by 2.1%, all other factors held constant. A study was then conducted adding four 
interaction terms in between quantity, quality and age. The reasoning for this was the 
hypothesis that the semi-elasticity of the price per bottle with respect to these three 
variables could depend on partial effects which they have on each other. 
The new regressions in specified as:
Log(priceperbottle) = α0 + α1quantity + α2order + α3numsold + α4quality + α5lnage +
β + ΓC + 1quantity*quality + 2quantity*age + 3quality*age + 
4quantity*quality*age + 
The addition of interaction terms cause independent variables to affect the model in 
different ways. It is important to distinguish between the two impacts which an 
explanatory variable will have on the dependant variable when interaction terms are 
added to the regression. Firstly we have the main effect. This effect is often considered 
the direct effect of the dependant variable, regardless of the interaction terms. This effect 
is better referred to as the constituent effect, as a main effect would imply that the 
variables which have interaction terms are interpretable alone, which they are not. The 
second effect is the interaction effect. This is described as the effect of a factor averaged 
over another factor. The total effect is denoted as the sum of the constituent and 
interaction effects.
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Table 6: Regression output of log-level model with interaction terms
Explanatory Variable Estimate Std.Error Explanatory Variable Estimate Std.Error
Quantity -0.755* (0.0360) Label Condition -0.054* (0.0145)
Order -0.0002* (0.00003) Re-labeled 0.642* (0.1196)
Number sold -0.0011 (0.0005) Re-corked -0.465* (0.1057)
Quality 0.119* (0.0026) Depressed cork -0.168 (0.1119)
Age -0.087* (0.0228) Raised cork -0.114 (0.2328)
Corroded capsule 0.166* (0.0709)
Cotes de Bourg 0.507* (0.1594) Damaged capsule -0.234* (0.0797)
Cotes de Castillon 0.418* (0.1537) No capsule 1.049* (0.2682)
Fronsac 0.392* (0.1616) Fill level 0.182* (0.0408)
Graves 1.126* (0.1554) Sediment 1.220* (0.3212)
Haut Medoc 0.521* (0.1557) Balthus labels 0.252* (0.1094)
Margaux 1.146* (0.1390) Constant -7.275* (0.2765)
Medoc 0.189 (0.1850)
Pauillac 1.139* (0.1381) Quantity * Quality 0.008* (0.0003)
Pessac-Leognan 1.025* (0.1387) Quantity * Age 0.060* (0.0027)
Pomerol 1.326* (0.1377) Quality * Age 0.0004* (0.00001)
Premieres Cotes de Bordeaux 0.105 (0.1620) Quantity * Quality * Age -0.0006* (0.00003)
St. Emilion 0.999* (0.1375)
St. Estephe 0.805* (0.1401) R-squared 0.7114
St. Julien 0.774* (0.1390) Root MSE 0.5288
* significant at 5%
Data: The Chicago Wine Company (www.tcwc.com)
We find that the addition of these four interaction terms (quantity * quality, quantity * 
age, quality * age and quantity * quality * age) alters the model slightly. The first and 
most noticeable change is the increase (in absolute terms) in the magnitude of the 
quantity variable. Secondly, we can notice a change in sign of the age variable. Besides 
these two changes (which will be analyzed shortly), most of the coefficients have similar 
values and significances. Surprisingly enough, the quality variable is not affected by the 
addition of the interaction terms. This is curious because generally, there is at least a 
small amount of interaction effects between variables. Since all the interaction terms are 
found to be significant at the 5% level, they all affect the model in a real sense.
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In the previous framework (which did not include interaction terms), the semi-
elasticity of price per bottle with respect to quantity depended solely on the quantity
variable (the constituent effect).19 In this framework however, the semi-elasticity depends
on three additional forces (the interaction effect).20 The total effect can be denoted as 
follows: 
priceperbottle with respect to quantity = 100*α1quantity + 100*1qualityquantity + 
100*2agequantity + 100*4(quality*age)quantity
Which simplifies to:
priceperbottle/quantity = -75.51 + 0.7786quality + 6.022age – 0.0629(quality*age)
This total effect at one point can be calculated by substituting in the median values 
for quality and age (93 and 5 respectively) obtained from the data summary. This gives us 
the median semi-elasticity:
priceperbottle/quantity =  -2.236
This result states that for the median observation, increasing the lot size by one bottle 
will cause a decrease in the price per bottle of the lot of 2.236%,15 all other things held 
                                                
19 (Logpriceperbottle)/quantity = α1
20 For the mean values of quality and age, we obtain a semi-elasticity of -1.425. The justification for using 
the median is made because age is very susceptible to outliers, causing the mean statistic to be skewed
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constant. This result is not much different than the 2.1% found in the model with no 
interaction terms. 
We can speculate as to which of the two models is more appropriate. Critics of 
interaction term models state that high levels of collinearity can arise, causing the 
estimates to be distorted.21 The interaction term model exhibits a slightly larger R2
statistic of 0.71 and a smaller mean squared error statistic, making it a more likely choice, 
regardless of the collinearity speculation. In essence however, both models have the same 
results and conclusions.
                                                                                                                                                
21 http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~branton/interaction/faqfund.htm
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VI. The Multi-vintage Model
When a wine auctioneer decides to sell her wines, she decides how to organize her 
goods to obtain the maximum profit. In any given auction, and particularly in The 
Company auctions, bottles can be sold in a variety of ways. We have seen from the 
previous section that the auctioneer can sell a bottle individually or in groups of 2 to 24.
This section will instead deal with the decision of the auctioneer to create multi-vintage
lots instead of single-vintage ones. 
A multi-vintage lot is a lot which consists of two or more wines with distinguishable
characteristics. This could include wines of different regions, or the same wines of
different years. One of these lots would be auctioned off and receive an individual price 
for all the bottles in the lot. The auctioneer could make the decision to pair a high quality 
wine with a weaker one to increase the total price paid for the lot. Conversely, this 
decision may cause a decrease in the desire for the high quality wine. 
The following study examines the profitability to the auctioneer of implementing a 
multi-vintage lot. To do this, we will first calculate a variable (which will serve as our 
dependant variable) to explain the success or failure of a seller to obtain more or less 
from her multi-vintage lot than she would have obtained had she sold the bottles of the lot 
individually. Since both multi-vintage and single-vintage lots are sold during the same 
time period, it is always possible for a buyer to purchase the individual bottles separately, 
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instead of purchasing a multi-vintage lot. Doing this, she loses the certainty of obtaining 
the particular bottles she wants individually. The data set was trimmed to include only the 
multi-vintage lots which contained bottles which were individually available at the same 
auctions the lots were being sold. This left a data sample of 122 observations.
We can state that an auctioneer has profited if her multi-vintage lot sells for more 
than it would have sold if the bottles had been sold individually. This can be calculated 
by individually computing the overall value of the lot using average wine prices complied 
from the data, and comparing this overall value with the actual price the consumer paid 
for the lot. As was mentioned earlier in section IV, this value was calculated using bottles 
of the exact same condition (they were all pristine) as the ones included in the multi-
vintage lots.
It is important to note that although it may seem pointless to compare the total 
“value” of a lot to the price actually paid (since in the auction system, a person pays her 
willingness to pay and therefore her value for it is equal to what she paid), we view the 
so-called compiled value more as the overall monetary worth of the lot rather than its 
utility to the buyer. 
If the consumer paid more than the overall compiled value, then she could have been 
better off buying the wines individually at the same auction. In this case we say that the 
lot was over valued. If, on the other hand, the overall compiled value of the lot was 
greater than the price the consumer paid for the lot, then we say that the lot was under 
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valued, and the consumer is better off buying the multi-vintage lot than the individual 
bottles. This over valuation or under valuation was calculated as a percentage and will 
serve as the dependant variable of our study. 
The following study examines all the multi-vintage lots which were auctioned off by 
the Company in the eleven auctions used. The analysis examines two different angles of 
the multi-vintage valuation starting with a probit regression which indicates which factors 
cause the lot to be either over valued or under valued. The second will consider an 
ordinary least squares regression which will explain to which degree certain factors affect 
the percentage of over valuation or under valuation.
The probit model is specified as:
Over valued = 1Order + 2Global Order + 3Lot Price + 4Quanity + High Price + 
6Low Price + 7High Quality + 8Low Quality + 9Var(Quality) + 1Same Year + 
2Same Chateau + 3Same Region + 
Where over valued is a binary variable which is equal to 1 when a lot is over valued
and 0 when a lot is under valued.
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The analysis yields the following results:
Table 7: Probit regression output of multi-vintage model
Explanatory Variable Estimate Std.Error Marginal Effect
Order -0.026 (0.0375) -0.0104
Global Order -0.018* (0.0071) -0.0072
Lot Price 0.023* (0.0046) 0.0092
Quantity -1.479* (0.3334) -0.5916
High Value -0.036* (0.0078) -0.0144
Low Value 0.009 (0.0100) 0.0036
High Quality 0.162 (0.1439) 0.0648
Low Quality -0.128 (0.1435) -0.0512
Variance of the Quality -0.022 (0.0196) -0.0088
Same Year -1.326* (0.6149) -0.5304
Same Chateau -0.241 (0.9148) -0.0964
Same Region -0.451 (0.5568) -0.1804
Log pseudo-likelihood -21.977
* significant at 5%
Data: The Chicago Wine Company (www.tcwc.com)
Table 7 shows the results of the probit estimation carried out on the multi-vintage
data. Due to the nature of probit estimations, the coefficients themselves are not directly
interpretable. The marginal effect is thus calculated and is listed next to the standard 
errors.22 This marginal effect represents the effect on the dependant variable of varying 
the respective independent variable by 1%.
From the table we can see that although many of the exogenous variables are not 
significant, many have the expected signs.
                                                
22 The marginal effect is approximated by dividing the probit coefficient by 2.5.
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The order variable is negative and not significant at the 5% level. It states that as the 
auction progresses, a multi-vintage lot’s chance of being under valued increases. In other 
words, a multi-vintage lot sold near the end of an auction has a higher chance of being 
under valued than a lot sold at the beginning of the auction, all other things equal.
Similar to this is the global order variable, which turns out to be significant at the 5% 
level. Also negative, the global order variable tells us that as the year progresses, (the 
2003 year consisted of 11 auctions) multi-vintage lots have a higher chance of being 
under valued, ceteris paribus. For example, if a lot were the 100th multi-vintage lot to be 
auctioned of during the course of the year, the chance that this lot would be under valued 
increases by 72%.
The lot price variable has a positive sign, which is expected, and is statistically 
significant. This states that the more a buyer paid for a particular lot, the higher the 
change that the lot would be over valued. This is consistent as the lot price and lot value 
are calculated independently and over valuation occurs when lot price is greater than lot 
value. The marginal effect tells us that increasing the lot price by 1$ would increase the 
chance of a lot to be over valued by 0.92%.
The quantity variable has a negative sign, which is an interesting result, and is 
significant at the 5% level. This negative coefficient states that increasing the number of 
bottles in a multi-vintage lot by one would lead to an increase in the chance of that lot 
being under valued by 59%. This result is interesting as it resembles the result previously 
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obtained for single-vintage lots. Previously in section V, we found that increasing the 
amount of the bottles in a single-vintage lot brought about a decrease in the price per 
bottle of that lot, ceteris paribus. The above conclusion about multi-vintage lots tells us 
that as we increase the number of bottles in a lot, we also increase the chance of under 
valuation, all other factors being held equal. Since under valuation occurs when the price 
paid is less than the compiled value, and the value is constant over all quantities, then we 
can infer that increasing the quantity of bottles in a multi-vintage lot causes the overall 
price per bottle of the lot to fall, causing under valuation.
The high value variable shows the expected sign and is significant. The low value 
however is positive, which is curious, but is insignificant. We would expect that both of 
these variables would be negative, stating that an increase in the maximum and minimum 
values of the multi-vintage lot would cause an increase in the percentage of under 
valuation, ceteris paribus.
The three quality-related variables are insignificant. The high quality variable is 
positive, which could hint towards the possibility of a direct relationship between quality 
and over valuation. The low quality variable, however, is negative which stands against 
this possible conclusion. This states that increasing the maximum quality of a multi-
vintage lot by one point will increase the chance that this lot is over valued by roughly 
6.5%. Conversely, increasing the minimum quality of the multi-vintage lot by one point 
would decrease the chance that a lot would be over valued. This result could hint that 
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higher quality bottles are more subject to being over valued whilst lower quality bottles 
are more subject to being under valued.
The final three variables are the binaries which deal with multi-vintage lot 
composition. Of the three, only the binary which specifies that the bottles in the lot were 
all produced in the same year is significant. Its coefficient tells us that having a multi-
vintage lot of bottles from the same year increases the chance of under valuation of the 
lot by 53%. The other two binaries, the ones that specify that a lot comprises of bottles 
from identical chateaus and identical regions, are also negative, despite being 
insignificant.
Whilst the previous probit model shows which factors cause a multi-vintage lot to be 
over or under valued, it does not examine the effect on the actual percentage of over or 
under valuation. The following ordinary least squares model will focus on this 
percentage, or in other words, the degree of over or under valuation.
% over valuation = 1Order + 2Global Order + 3Lot Price + 4Lot Value + 
5Quanity + 6High Price + 7Low Price + 8High Quality + 9Low Quality + 
10Var(Quality) + 1Same Year + 2Same Chateau + 3Same Region + 

Where the % over valuation is positive in the case of an over valued lot and negative 
in the case of an under valued lot.
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The ordinary least squares regression results are exhibited in the following table:
Table 8: OLS regression output of multi-vintage model 
Explanatory Variable Estimate Std.Error Explanatory Variable Estimate Std.Error
Order -0.978* (0.4234) High Value -0.027 (0.0357)
Global Order -0.403* (0.1413) Low Value 0.150 (0.1642)
Lot Price 0.066* (0.0232) High Quality -3.393 (2.1715)
Quantity -4.873* (2.2045) Low Quality 3.403 (2.2882)
Variance of Quality 0.210 (0.3407)
Same Year 11.553 (12.180)
Same Chateau -6.525 (20.822)
Same Region -1.619 (8.7336)
* significant at 5%
R-squared 0.5093
Root MSE 46.035
Data: The Chicago Wine Company (www.tcwc.com)
The above table shows the output of the ordinary least squares regression. Whilst the 
regression in itself is different from the probit one performed above, many similar 
conclusions can still be drawn from this model.
The order variable is once again negative, but is now significant. It states that a lot 
which is sold early in an auction will be less under valued (by 0.98% per unit of order) 
than a lot which is sold near the end of the auction, ceteris paribus. More specifically, if a 
multi-vintage lot is the 7th of its kind to be sold, it will be 5.9% more under valued than 
the first lot to be sold, all things equal. 
Similarly, the global order variable is also negative and significant. Its interpretation
is much like the above order variable, except spread out over the year. The global order 
variable states that multi-vintage lots which are sold near the end of the year will be more 
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under valued (by 0.403% per unit of global order), all other factors held constant. This 
result may hint at the presence of a business cycle concerning wine prices as we see that 
prices fluctuate as the year progresses. 
The next variable, lot price, is positive (which is expected). The coefficient states that 
as the price paid for the lot increases, its percentage chance of overvaluation increases 
too. This tells us that high-priced lots are often more overvalued than lower priced lots, a 
result similar to the one found earlier in the probit model. 
The quantity variable is once again negative and significant. The coefficient states 
that increasing the number of bottles in a multi-vintage lot by one would cause an
increase in under valuation by roughly 5%, ceteris paribus. This gives us a result 
consistent to the one found in the probit model which is once again similar to what is 
obtained in section V.
The high and low value variables the same signs as in the probit regression, but they 
are this time both insignificant (previously only the low value variable was insignificant). 
Their interpretation is expected and similar to the ones found in the probit model. The 
high value variable states that as we increase the highest valued bottle of wine in a multi-
vintage lot, the percentage of over valuation decreases by 0.027% per unit, all other 
factors held constant. Conversely, the low value states that as we increase the lowest 
valued bottle in the lot by one, the percentage of over valuation of the lot increases by 
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0.15%, ceteris paribus. Despite these results being statistically insignificant, their signs 
and magnitudes are interpretable economically. 
The three quality variables are statistically insignificant as they were in the probit 
model. The coefficients state that increasing the maximum quality of a wine in a lot will 
cause the percentage of over valuation to decrease. Conversely, decreasing the minimum 
quality of the lot would increase the percentage of over valuation of that lot, ceteris 
paribus. These results do not coincide with the probit model proposed earlier (since in the 
probit a higher maximum favored over valuation and vice versa).
The lot composition dummies tell us that if the wines in the multi-vintage lot are all 
from the same year, the percentage over valuation of that lot will increase by 11%, all 
factors remaining equal. Conversely if a multi-vintage lot’s wines are all from the same 
chateau or region, then their percentage of over valuation will fall. These coefficients are 
not statistically significant.
From the above models we can see that many of our previously obtained results are 
apparent in both the ordinary least squares model and the probit model. Whilst both 
models have coefficients with different signs, the majority of the significant variables are 
the same. We can see that factors such as the order of the lot (in the both the auction and 
in the year) and the number of bottles in the lot will be significant in determining the over 
or under valuation of a lot.
51
VII. Conclusion
The beginning of section V exhibited a study (summarized in table 4) which 
examined the price per bottle with respect to lot size of three wines without taking into 
account the particular characteristics of the wines. The conclusion of this study was that 
as the lot size increased for these wines, so did the price per bottle, which coincides with 
the study performed by Bentzen and Smith (2003). Section IV followed to perform two 
regressions which took into account the particular characteristics of the wines to obtain 
the semi elasticity of the price per bottle on the lot size. These regressions yielded a 
negative semi elasticity concluding that increasing the number of bottles in a lot led to a 
decrease of the price per bottle of that lot, the opposite of the initial study. Thus we can 
see that not taking into account the particular characteristics of wines can lead to an 
analysis with false conclusions about the price per bottle in increasing lot sizes. 
Section VI concentrated on the characteristics of multi-vintage lots which cause them 
to be over or under valued. Through probit and ordinary least squares regressions, we 
were able to establish a positive and significant relationship between quantity and under 
valuation. This stated a similar conclusion to the one found in section V: increasing lot 
size would decrease the price paid per bottle, thus increasing the chance of the lot being 
under valued. This yields a final conclusion which states that if an auctioneer wanted to 
obtain the maximum price per bottle for each lot she sold, she would be best off selling
her wines individually, in single unit lots.
52
An area which would be interesting to examine further could be the addition of 
financial indicators to the model to discern some sort of link between economic 
performance and wine sales. This would serve to discern if wine prices fluctuate as the 
year progresses, according to the current economy and business cycles. It would be 
interesting to compare wine prices to interest rates of real estate and other forms of 
investments to see if certain people see wine purchasing as an alternate form of 
investment. This could lead to individuals purchasing wine for a resale motive rather than 
a personal consumption motive. 
For the multi-vintage study, it would be very interesting to see if it would be possible 
to account for the costs of the buyer. Since the buyer incurs a cost by remaining at the 
auction the entire day to buy single bottle lots, we can assume that she “saves” by 
purchasing one lot with all the desired bottles. It would be very interesting to see if this 




Figure 1: Average prices per bottle of three selected Bordeaux wines 
according to lot size




















Source: The Chicago Wine Company (www.tcwc.com)
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Figure 2: Wine producing region of Bordeaux in France
Source: Great wine capitals: Global Network (http://www.greatwinecapitals.com)
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Figure 3: Wine bottle dimensions
Source: West Coast Wine (www.westcoastwine.net)
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Source: Terriors France (http://www.terroirs-france.com)
























Source: Terriors France (http://www.terroirs-france.com)
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Source: Terriors France (http://www.terroirs-france.com)
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Table I: Greater and Sub-Region Wine Production Statistics
Area* % Production** %
MEDOC
Médoc 4900 32.89 40 33.70
Haut Médoc 4250 28.52 36 30.33
Margaux 1300 8.72 9.5 8.00
St. Estèphe 1200 8.05 9 7.58
Pauillac 1100 7.38 8.5 7.16
St. Julien 900 6.04 6.5 5.48
Moulis 550 3.69 4.2 3.54
Listrac 700 4.70 5 4.21
GRAVES
Graves 3000 29.18 22 35.89
Pessac Léognan 1350 13.13 9 14.68
Sauternes 1800 17.51 4.5 7.34
Barsac 830 8.07 1.8 2.94
Premières Côtes 3300 32.10 24 39.15
RIVERS
Bordeaux Supérieur 49000 95.33 475 96.94
Entre deux mers 2400 4.67 15 3.06
COTES
St. Emilion 5500 37.70 36 34.65
Côtes de Castillon 2900 19.88 22 21.17
Côtes de Francs 490 3.36 3.6 3.46
Pomerol 800 5.48 5.3 5.10
Fronsac 1200 8.22 6 5.77
Côtes de Bourg 3700 25.36 31 29.84
BORDEAUX
Médoc 14900 16.34 118.7 15.34
Graves 10280 11.28 61.3 7.92
Rivers 51400 56.38 490 63.32
Côtes 14590 16.00 103.9 13.43
* Denoted in hectares
** Denoted in millions of bottles
Source: Terriors France (http://www.terroirs-france.com)
60
Table II: Sub-Region production as a percentage of Entire Bordeaux 
Production
Sub-Region Area* % Production** %
Médoc 4900 5.37 40 5.17
Haut Médoc 4250 4.66 36 4.65
Margaux 1300 1.43 9.5 1.23
St. Estèphe 1200 1.32 9 1.16
Pauillac 1100 1.21 8.5 1.10
St. Julien 900 0.99 6.5 0.84
Moulis 550 0.60 4.2 0.54
Listrac 700 0.77 5 0.65
Graves 3000 3.29 22 2.84
Pessac Léognan 1350 1.48 9 1.16
Sauternes 1800 1.97 4.5 0.58
Barsac 830 0.91 1.8 0.23
Premières Côtes 3300 3.62 24 3.10
Bordeaux Supérieur 49000 53.75 475 61.38
Entre deux meres 2400 2.63 15 1.94
St. Emilion 5500 6.03 36 4.65
Côtes de Castillon 2900 3.18 22 2.84
Côtes de Francs 490 0.54 3.6 0.47
Pomerol 800 0.88 5.3 0.68
Fronsac 1200 1.32 6 0.78
Côtes de Bourg 3700 4.06 31 4.01
* Denoted in hectares
** Denoted in millions of bottles
Source: Terriors France (http://www.terroirs-france.com)
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Table III: Summary of Sub-region dummies
Sub-region Lots*
Côtes de Bourg 43
Côtes de Castillon 57
Fronsac 39
Graves 62 Greater Region Lots*
Haut Médoc 51
Margaux 582 Médoc 3087
Médoc 18 Graves 716
Pauillac 1569 Rivers 15
Pessac Léognan 616 Côtes 3595
Pomerol 1318






* Lots contain between 1 and 24 bottles of the same wine
** Bordeaux Supérieur used as zero condition for dummy variables
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